“STAND BY” said Lt. Paul Smyth emphatically.
  Copilot  Lt. Richard Leonard followed calmly:    “Standby, we have a problem right now.”
  Without any clarification, the radar plot controllers aboard the USS carrier Kennedy waited. Expecting this clarification to come any second, they tracked the KA-6 Attack Bomber on their scopes. Although it was supposed to be heading toward them, it had actually been vectored to a heading of 270^o due west, directly opposite the carrier, in preparation to come around for landing. It was only about 30 miles away right now.
  The Kennedy was about 100 miles off Norfolk Virginia.  The KA-6 Attack Bomber, “Fighting Tiger 524” had just taken off from NAS Oceana, Virginia about 20 minutes before, with orders to land on the carrier.
   Presently Fighting Tiger 524 was at 14,000 feet. The Plot was about to initiate contact when suddenly Fighting Tiger 524 vanished from the scope.

   There is no explanation for what happened to the KA-6 Attack Bomber, nor clue to  what it encountered when it vanished that caused it to lose its IFF signal when it returned, or what kind of situation it was that made it impossible for either pilots to clarify it in the several minutes they had. There is the possibility that neither could, for both IFF and radio are electronic; perhaps they had tried and their radio now, like their IFF, was incapable of proper function.
   A further point in the electronic mystery is the failure of ejection signals. Ejection would trigger emergency beacons, one in each seat. Like the ELT or EPIRB this signal would lead rescuers to the accident point where ejection took place. The records show the pilots had more then enough time to clarify the situation (providing they understood it) and more than enough time to eject, seeing all was lost. The failure of these electronic devices merely made the investigation conclude with the following:    

Opinion: Cause as to the loss of AB524 and the subsequent deaths of LT. SMYTH and LT. LEONARD is unknown. It is evident that two minutes prior to AB524’s disappearance, the crew was having some difficulty or experiencing a minor emergency as revealed by the voice tape transcripts. Due to the lack of further radio transmissions, no hypothesis can be made as to the type or severity of the initial difficulty. It is suspected, however, that a catastrophic situation developed after the final radio transmission and LT SMYTH and LT LEONARD were incapable of coping with the situation. It is further believed that the crew did not attempt to eject as the concurrent failure of both URT-33 beacon radios was unlikely. Thus, this investigation concludes that a catastrophic emergency situation developed, incapacitated the crew to the point that they were unable to eject and were subsequently lost at sea.

February 22, 1978. Around 2:35. p.m.

A meaty aircraft, the KA-6 Attack Bomber was used extensively since it came out in 1959. It is the more modern equivalent of the dive bomber, such as the W.W. II TBM. It carries only 2 crew, is much smaller than the big bombers, but not as agile as the fighters.

  “524 radar contact lost.”
   There was no response. A few minutes later the radar controller repeated. There was still no answer. The supervisor then placed the DOWN AIRCRAFT symbol on the NTDS radar scope, alerting all controllers aboard Kennedy to a downed aircraft. As soon as this appeared in CIC, the strike controller noted a raw radar return, however this time devoid of any IFF, about 12 miles southwest of Fighting Tiger’s last position, heading now 220^o. It lasted for a few minutes, then disappeared.
   They identified it as an aircraft track. However, there was no explanation why Smyth or Leonard made no contact in those minutes it was being tracked, nor why there was no IFF signal anymore.
   An immediate search found no traces of the aircraft. The sea had been choppy, but the weather had been fine, only 15,000 feet cloud tops and a haze layer at 17,000 feet.
   The mystery of the missing IFF return on the second radar target is unusual. When approaching the Kennedy, Leonard and Smyth had reported that they had no TACAN lock on it (homing device), thereby not being able to identify it with their navigational instruments. However, on the other hand, Kennedy was able to read their IFF signal easy enough.     

Arguments on Shape

For an explanation of why an incident off Norfolk is considered part of the Triangle, go to the following link.

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