Bad Navigation?


	Bad Navigation?

Bad Navigation?

Views of the Okefenokee

Remembering Flight 19

The Book
Foreword Online
Press Release
Limited Edition release

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	Flight 19, December 5, 1945

Some of the worst misinformation, sadly, originates with the only author who was able to publish a book entirely devoted to Flight 19. This was Lawrence Kusche who wrote The Disappearance of Flight 19 in 1980, the culmination of his years of ‘’research.’’ The book, furthermore, was promoted as being written by a man who ‘’set new standards for investigative reporting on popular subjects.’’ This becomes a ghastly canard when Kusche’s numerous false statements are brought to light, the reason for which seems merely to undermine the “legend” and the “sensationalists” and to find something elemental, if not simple to blame. This superficial approach to the subject was fraught with as much inaccuracy as the sensationalistic.
For instance, Kusche supplants the very foundation of Problem




		Exhibit 1 offered in evidence. The various triangular training flight plans flown out of Fort Lauderdale. The one in question is the northern one, highlighted here in blue. Every map and chart with Problem Navigation No. 1 reiterates Jackson’s testimony visually: Fort Lauderdale to Hen and Chicken Shoals, proceed to Great Stirrup Cay; from there the next leg went north, passing over large Grand Bahama Island; within sight ‘’of a large island’’ (Great Sale Cay), they would turn southwest back to Fort Lauderdale, crossing Grand Bahama at another point (Copy of map from official report)

Navigation No. 1, replacing the real navigational hop with a bogus one of his own concoction: “’With the exception of Hen and Chicken Shoals, there were no positive landmarks over which the lead changes took place. Each student pilot knew only that when he took over the lead, he was to fly a certain heading for a predetermined time. If the navigation had gone wrong on a previous leg, he would not have known it, because when he was not flying the lead, he was kept busy flying formation.’’
   This is shockingly inaccurate. The Testimony of Lt. James Roy Jackson, the carrier qualifications, communications, and navigational phase training officer. Question 16 of the Board: “How do pilots on navigation flights determine or check the accuracy of their navigation while flying the problem assigned?’’
A. “With one exception the termination of all legs touch a point of land and that one exception is within sight of a large island.’’
   Although Kusche claims to have relied on the Naval Board of Inquiry Report, the same report from which the quotes on this page are taken, his above statement is just one example of his ignorance of this report or of his intentional misrepresentation of it.
   Kusche’s analytical inhibitions might be a greater factor in his errors, considering the contradictory and unqualified statements he makes throughout his book. For instance, on page 9 alone he states that at one corner of the triangular flight plan “If the visibility was good, the island [Great Stirrup Cay] might be seen to the right as they turned north.” But then moments later he writes: “The purpose of the flight was to give the students practice in dead-reckoning navigation. They were to find their way across the water without the use of any landmarks, by plotting in advance the heading to be flown on each leg . . .If the wind estimates and navigation were accurate, the planes should arrive at any given position on the route at the estimated time. If there was no positive landmark that could be used to check navigational accuracy . . .all the pilots could do was trust that the wind estimates and navigation had been close . . . . . . The success of the flights was largely measured by how close the pilots were to Fort Lauderdale when they recrossed the coast.”




	The Plotting Board in an Avenger. A pilot kept track of his course on here. After the flight, these would be examined and discussed. The flight leader would pass or fail a pilot partly based on this his record of navigation keeping. For some extraordinary reason, Kusche was to write: “During rough weather, however, as on this day, flying in formation required their full attention. With the left hand on the throttle and the right hand on the stick, trailing pilots were often unable to keep up their navigation on the plotting board.”

It is hard to imagine that such contradictory statements originate with an objective mind. Dead-reckoning has no land marks whatsoever. But Kusche seems to teeter-totter between their existence and not.
   Not only is Kusche’s flight plan apocryphal, this and his analysis are so wholly illogical it staggers the mind. His would be self-defeating to the purpose of training pilots since it has no definite landmark as a cross reference by which they could grade their individual progress. If the flight recrossed the coast in error, which pilot was to blame? How could the flight leader even determine if he didn’t know which one missed his landmark? Do you flunk 3 good navigators because one was bad?
   Kusche’s ludicrous flight plan begs such questions, but the real navigational hop, which the Navy used, does not. It is a logical and basic training maneuver for pilots used throughout the war.
   But Kusche’s approach provides him with a simple basis for how five pilots to get so lost without any landmark, because all it would take is one pilot to get them lost and the others would blindly follow.He follows the above supposition and places himself in the cockpit that day. ‘’The right hand controlled the stick, the left stayed on the throttle; continuous attention was required in the close group. Pilots flying in formation are generally so involved that not only do they not keep track of their position, they often do not even pay attention to the direction in which they are heading.’’
Oh, that’s a reassuring procedure for navigation training.

   Question 18 of the Board to Lt. Jackson ‘’Does navigation instruction for student pilots point out the value of frequent comparison between mechanical and remote reading compasses?’’
   A. ‘’In ground school when flying the link trainers and in the problems they work in ground school, it is brought out in each period the value of comparing their compasses at all times.’’
   Besides trained to check their compasses frequently, each student was trained to know each others headings. The Testimony of Commander Thomas A. Jenkins, Aviation Training Officer: ‘’The problem itself is worked out under the supervision of the instructor and each student’s navigation is checked by other students and the instructor prior to departing on the flight.’’
   This was for a very good reason. Each pilot knew the headings for each leg of the flight, regardless if he was the pilot for that leg or

not. The very purpose of the mission was to give the pilots the opportunity to plot and cross-check each other’s navigation. If a landmark was missed, it meant that not only was the lead pilot for that leg guilty but so were the others for not catching his mistake.
   Prob Nav 1 was for navigation training, not flight formation training. In fact, after they got lost Taylor was heard to say twice: ‘’All planes in flight, close formation,’’ an indication that the training flight had not been as tightly grouped as Kusche’s imagination conveys, and they could use, as they must, their plotting boards.
   But this argument would probably not convince Kusche, since he even calls into question the reliability of plotting boards. “Plotting boards were not that precise,” he writes later, and he said that they were “nearly impossible to use” on a route with many short turns, as Flight 19 was on. Flight 19 was not necessarily on short routes by carrier standards. If Kusche is right, it is amazing the whole US Navy did not vanish considering this was in use on all Naval aircraft. This is what all pilots used in the Pacific, flying off carriers to find a moving enemy fleet and then finding their way back to their own moving carrier.
   He also resorts to the Manual for Naval Aviators, which says ‘’the plotting board is the only navigational aid available in ship based planes.’’ He adds that this ‘’obscure factor’’ which was ‘’tucked away’’ in the manual has greater significance for the loss of Flight 19 than all the ‘’sensationalistic solutions’’ of UFOs, Time-Warps, and electromagnetic forces. His obscure factor leads him to unwarranted dogma: He declares: ‘’The men who were lost on Navigation Problem Number One on December 5, 1945, were not carrying maps.’’




		Interior of the Link Trainer building, looking up at the ceiling, with the original cooling and ventilation system. This will be the largest display room in the NAS Fort Lauderdale Historical Association when complete.

It is Kusche’s logic which is obscure, and nothing else. In over-water navigation there is no point in having maps since there is nothing for them to show. All the manual is saying is that maps and charts were not used for navigational purposes. They could be carried and used for identification purposes. The map case in Avengers is an easy point of reference in most every cockpit. (Kusche claimed to have examined the cockpit of a museum Avenger and to have spoken with numerous Avenger pilots but tastefully overlooks mentioning the map case.) They were always used for cross country flying. It was at the discretion of the pilot if he wished to carry maps with him otherwise.




	A pristine Avenger cockpit. On the left, by the armrest, is the leather pouch for the maps. A standard piece of equipment.

   It is rather evident that Kusche is looking for an excessively simple deduction on Taylor’s part. The lack of maps makes Kusche conclude: “Thus, when Taylor saw the island he had mentioned, he had no way of determining which one it was. Not having flown the area before, he mistakeningly assumed he was seeing ‘his old stomping grounds,’ the Florida Keys.”
   Kusche’s leap in logic is apparently based upon his only visit to the Triangle in which he flew the triangular training course and then flew southwest to the Keys: ‘’Flying the route of Flight 19 reinforced the conclusion that parts of the Bahamas and the Florida Keys look enough alike that a lost pilot could assume that one was the other.’’
   Well, not really. It would take a major navigational mistake to be near the Keys, since they were about 150 to 175 miles away from the second leg of Prob Nav 1, the point where Taylor took over. It would, really, take following a major compass malfunction for over an hour.
   But one of Kusche’s most absurd tangential red herrings is to question whether Taylor’s compasses were indeed malfunctioning: “Taylor could have convinced himself that he was in the Keys if he had failed to pay proper attention to his

navigation, seen some Bahamian islands he thought he recognized as the Keys, then assumed his compasses were wrong.” This above deduction was a coattail to his dissertation that a “pilot’s usual first reaction when he gets lost is to doubt his compass. It is tempting to have more confidence in terrain that looks familiar than in a compass that disagrees with the comforting landmarks.”
   Reality, in the case of Flight 19, is quite different. Taylor could crosscheck his compasses with the four other pilots. The radio logs record a discussion on headings and compasses. Obviously theirs said something different or Taylor would have realized that his were not wrong. Also, as late as 6:37 p.m. that night he is overheard to ask Powers “What course are we on now?” The question is pointless if his compass is working.
   Kusche continues to promote this to this day, saying that Taylor was used to flying over the Keys since that is where Miami training took place. He was simply confused. . .and a careless navigator. This is yet another statement of illogic and proof of ignorance of, or contempt for, the report. Miami based pilots also overflew this area in training, after all there was only 20 miles difference between the two bases.
   The Testimony of Lt. Lee Conklin: “I had one hop with him [Taylor] as an assistant instructor. It was a navigation hop out of NAS Miami. We rendezvoused at our said point and came back home and he took us right to the station. I had Captain Powers and Captain Stivers with me at that time too.”
   Testimony of Lt. James Roy Jackson. Question 4 “How far had the students progressed in the navigation syllabus?”
   A. “This was their third and last flight. They had had two in Miami before reporting to Fort Lauderdale.”
   The Testimony of Lt. Commander Donald J. Poole. “From our records, I considered all personnel fully qualified to perform their third and last navigation flight in a satisfactory manner. Navigation flights 1 & 2 were similiar in nature and covered the same general over-water territory.”
   Q. 3 of the Board to Lt. James Roy Jackson: “What navigational instructions did you give to the five missing TBM pilots on 5 December 1945?”
   A. “I gave the students no instructions prior to the flight but had previously briefed the instructor, Lieutenant Taylor, on his duties and in the conduct of his flight.”
   The Testimony of Lt. Willard L. Stoll, flight leader of Flight 18. Question 8 of the Board: “Did you see any of the material used by Lieutenant Taylor in briefing his students prior to his takeoff on Flight No. 19?”
   A. “Yes sir. I saw Lieutenant Taylor’s true headings for all legs and distances which coincided with navigation problem No. 1, Naval Air Station, Fort Lauderdale. I saw this information on the blackboard opposite the names from his flight. The winds used by Lieutenant Taylor’s flight were the same winds given from Aerology and used by my flight, No 18.”
   Change of Command in Flight 19 is a cog in the “legend” of Flight 19. Kusche also took exception to this, relying on the semantics of ‘’Lead’’ and ‘’Command.’’ No such lengthy debates are necessary. Taylor’s dialogue shows he was not giving orders. However, Kusche’s treatment of it is worthy of a final look since it reveals the paucity of his acquaintance with the actual Board of Inquiry Report. ‘’The issue very likely arose because of Opinion 34 in the report which states that ‘Captain Powers assumed the lead of Flight 19 and maintained a course of 270 [west].’ ...It is not apparent, however, why this opinion was given at all, as there is nothing in the station logs or in any of the testimony from which it might have been taken. The situation is further muddled by Opinion 35, which states that at 6:06 Taylor suggested* that Powers head east again.’’ (*Italics are Kusche’s.)
Three logs clearly contain the word suggest. Opinion 35 did not make up the word nor muddle anything. How many times does Taylor ask Powers what course are they on? The question is pointless if Powers is not leading. Had Kusche not been ignorant of Powers’ seniority in rank, (his book, in fact, dealt with the other pilots as mere bit players, if not outright walk-ons), there would be no real issue. Compass malfunction is also a prime cog in the “legend of Flight 19,” something that Bermuda Triangle buffs exploited to the hilt. In their case, they expanded it to apply to all compasses; something quite untrue. Taylor’s compass malfunction is well documented and is the kernel from which that legend grew. But whatever the sensationalists took to the one extreme, Kusche seemed to take to the opposite extreme, leaving him with an equally improbable flight for Flight 19 and an equally improbable solution in simple misidentification and bad navigation.
   There is little to be gained from Kusche’s farcical flight. It misrepresents Naval Aviation, the very course they were on, and ignores the training they had received. I see little difference between its credibility and those “sensationalistic” accounts of UFOs kidnapping the pilots . . . except theirs never hurt or impuned the reputation of anybody.
   The Board of Inquiry Report is 500 pages of testimony, plane logs, charts, communications and radio logs, Opinions and Findings of Facts. I had to have my copy run off by a special microfilm company. It was not filmed on standard sized paper and cannot be run off on most library microfilm readers because the pages cannot be condensed to fit into the square provided on their monitors. Although Larry Kusche claims to have relied on this report, his reconstruction is not supported by these documents. On the contrary, they reveal his rendition as more inventive than investigative. The abundance of his bogus statements and dubious deductions force me to assume that a myopic purpose to lay an elemental cause on Flight 19 dictated the tenor of his error-filled account. His misuse of this report was the misuse of a very powerful weapon, and what few shots he fires his book reveals is in the hands of a lousy aim.
   Most every great mystery of aviation has had sober and well researched biographies written about them. The loss of the airship Hindenberg and the disappearance of Amelia Earhart are two such examples. Flight 19, like them, is one of the greatest mysteries of aviation. Unfortunately, it became obscured by the “Bermuda Triangle.” Its cry for an accurate biography should have been answered by a serious attempt to find the real facts, place them in order, and find an explanation, not find guilt or dispel tabloid rumors. An inaccurate characterization of Charles Taylor and the training methods for naval aviators, and even questions regarding the method of naval aviation, complete Kusche’s false triad for sloppy navigation and simple confusion. “Everybody likes a good mystery,” Kusche was quoted in a newspaper, “But to me, the really intelligent person likes the truth.”


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